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Introduction* 
 
The issue relating to international prudential co-operation has attracted growing attention in the last 
years.  The issue is not a new one since the first forms of cross-border co-operation are almost thirty 
years old and the cause of this interest should then be explained against the background of the 
increasing development of international financial activity.  Between 1985 and 1998, the stock of 
public and private-sector bonds in the G-10 countries grew from 90 to 127 per cent of their 
combined GDP, the capitalization of their stock markets from 30 to 97 per cent.  The ratio between 
overseas and domestic banking loans grew from 34 to 40 per cent in the ’90.  The flow of new loans 
originating in countries reporting to the BIS – namely the industrial countries and the leading off-
shore centres – and destined for non-residents peaked at $ 1,100 billion in 19971.  Most of the total 
amount was accounted for by interbank transactions. 
 
But apart large volumes, international financial activities have also other important features: there is 
a close interrelation across markets; products and techniques are more sophisticated; intermediaries 
are changing their characteristics for more complex forms. 
 
National regulators and supervisors are aware that it is not possible to cope with these developments 
without strengthening international co-operation.  The Asian crisis in 1997 revolutionized the 
conventional wisdom according to which local prudential problems should remain local issues, 
highlighting that a prudential shock may have global economic repercussions. 
 
Thus, more attention has been dedicated to international systemic risk and to how national 
authorities may cope with it, going beyond the simple mandating of minimum capital adequacy 
international standards2.  In other words, supervisory authorities are increasingly focused on 
international financial stability and on the ways to improve it thanks to an enhanced co-operation. 
 
The European situation makes no exception to these trends.  The European Union is well ahead on 
the path for integrating national financial markets into a Single Market.  Financial operators enjoy 
complete freedom of movement across Member States while the introduction of the single currency 
offered new opportunity of business all over the Continent. 
 
However, European prudential regulators and supervisors still face many challenges in ensuring 
growth and stability.  There are many barriers that hinder a complete integration because legal, 
cultural and tax policy differences are still very strong.  Furthermore, with the accession of new 
Member States from Eastern Europe, these differences will be even more evident considering the 
specific history of these countries.  As a consequence, cross-border co-operation is an essential tool 
to overcome the obstacles to further integration and ensure proper governance to the European 
financial system.  
 
This paper will provide in the first place an overlook at the principles underlying international 
supervisory co-operation.  Then it will subsequently review the supervisory forms of collaboration, 
at international level.  It will provide a specific description of the co-operation practices in the 
European Union, placing the emphasis on the newly approved reform for regulatory and 
                                                          
* The views expressed here are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy.  The author 
would like to thank G. Godano, L. Teo, M. Trapanese and S.Vori for their valuable comments on earlier versions of the 
paper; the author remains responsible for any error.  
1 Source: Bank of Italy. Annual Report. Rome, 1999: 21-35. 
2 B. Gup, The new Financial Architecture, Banking Regulation in the 21st Century, London, 2000: 4. 
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supervisory co-operation.  Finally, the paper will focus on international co-operation in crisis 
management. 
 
 
1. The Principles of International Supervisory Co-operation 
 
In the aftermath of Bretton Woods’ system collapse and the increasing volatility of capital flows, 
major industrial States became aware of the need for coordination among supervisory authorities.  
The approach used was based on a step-by-step method, according to which it was important to 
effectively supervise the cross-border activities of banking and financial intermediaries without 
losing the traditional perspective of a prudential sovereignty exercised by national authorities. 
 
There was an implicit choice to use general principles rather than predefined forms of co-operation.  
These principles are incorporated in domestic law according to particular national  circumstances.  
This approach facilitates the ability to reach consensus among States and, at the same time, it leaves 
room for a certain freedom in adapting the principles to the domestic situation. 
 
An example of these principles can be the Basle Concordat of 19753 which stated that, firstly, no 
foreign banking establishment should escape supervision; and secondly, that the supervision should 
be adequate.  It’s clear how simple these two principles are.  But, at the same time, they express an 
“essential truth” that constitutes the basis of international co-operation: without them current 
structures wouldn’t exist. 
 
The Basle Concordat was revised in 1983 to introduce the principle of consolidated supervision, 
according to which home country authorities have a primary responsibility in conducting 
supervisory control.  This led to the spread of the home country control’s approach which nowadays 
is a normal procedure for every country that participates actively in prudential co-operation.  
 
More recently, the Basel Committee’s “Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision” of 1997 
have reformulated the basic assumptions underlying international banking supervisory co-operation.  
The Core Principles provide that national authorities must exercise a consolidated supervision over 
internationally active banking groups, and that there must be close contacts with host country 
supervisory authorities, which are obliged to apply to foreign banks the same prudential standards 
required of domestic institutions. 
 
Also the European Community (EC) has affirmed the basic principle of home-host countries 
sharing of responsibilities, but moving from a different starting point.  The home country control 
principle has been incorporated in all the major financial directives (89/646/EEC4 and 93/22/EC5) 
as a consequence of the evolution of the European Court’s case law6.  To solve the difficult question 
of legislative convergence among Member States, the European Court of Justice acknowledged, in 
the case of the Cassis de Dijon7, the possibility of a mutual recognition of national legislations, 
provided that minimal harmonization is reached.  The implementation of this scheme leads to the 
                                                          
3 Report to the Governors on the supervision of banks’ foreign establishments, Basle, 1975, BS/75/44. 
4 Second Council Directive of 15 December 1989 on the co-ordination of laws, regulation and administrative provisions 
relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions and amending Directive 77/780/EEC 
(89/646/EEC) in J.O.C.E. L386 of 30th December 1989. 
5 Directive of 10th May 1993 on investment services in the securities field in J.O.C.E. L141 of 11th  June 1993. 
6 A rough sketch of the principle was first drawn within the Directive 77/780/EEC;  however, an organic view on the 
matter was achieved only later. 
7 Case 120/78, Cassis de Dijon, [1979] ECR 649. 
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possibility of having the so-called “European Passport” under the aegis of the home country 
authority which is chiefly responsible for controlling it8. 
 
Apparently, the use of general principles such as the ones described could bear the risk of an uneven 
development of supervisory practices all over the world.   In fact, many factors might influence how 
these principles are transposed in the domestic legislation: evolution of the local financial system; 
social and political interests; presence of effective supervisory structures; etc.  The danger is then 
represented by possible normative loopholes that favour arbitrage. 
 
Actually, the dimension of this danger is reduced by the presence of international co-operation  
structures that allow an effective approach to the implementation of international standards.  In fact, 
the need for a real collaboration has forced supervisory authorities to articulate their relationships in 
a way that allows them to overcome the simple phase of agreeing on general principles.  
Considering the extension and the sophistication acquired by financial activity in the last twenty 
years, it is essential to specify how prudential activity should be exercised and to find ways to 
implement it effectively. 
 
 
2. International Supervisory Structures 
 
Supervisory structures are the natural complement to agreed general principles.  They represent the 
logical consequence to the establishment of rules that cannot stand without a follow-up which has 
the task to provide a framework where the principles can be implemented. 
 
 
2.1 Bilateral Co-operation 
 
Historically, international co-operation has taken two major directions: the establishment of 
bilateral relationships and the creation of international supervisory fora.  Bilateral co-operation  
encompasses every type of contact linking two supervisory authorities, at an official as well as 
unofficial level.  Hence, it is easy to understand how wide the landscape of these relationships could 
be.  This is the result of a progressive stratification of contacts that involves every layer of the 
national authorities involved. 
 
Moreover, it is important to stress that bilateral co-operation is very resilient in that it can be 
arranged according to specific needs and circumstances.  Supervisory authorities can develop their 
relationships with their foreign counterparts according to the overseas presence of national banking 
or financial intermediaries, the type of activity exercised and the extent to which it is considered 
useful to have such a relationship. 
 
The bilateral relations can be established through formal or informal links.  The spectrum of 
diplomatic tools available is wide enough to allow supervisory authorities to choose the best 
suitable solutions.  The bilateral experience then shows a widespread use of gentleman’s 
agreements, exchanges of letters, memorandums of understanding or more formal executive 
agreements.  Banca d’Italia, for example, has concluded informal agreements with some 
supervisory authorities in South-East Asia in accordance with which prudential interventions, such 
as the request for information or on-site inspections, are processed on a case-by-case basis and by 
applying the rule of reciprocity. 
                                                          
8 See extensively on the matter, G. Godano, Le banche, in Il diritto privato dell’Unione europea (ed. A. Tizzano), 2000, 
p. 315 ss. 
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When contacts are more frequent or there is an institutional constraint to respect, as it is the case in 
the EU, supervisory authorities may prefer to conclude agreements that create a more stable 
environment.  The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is the privileged instrument in this 
respect because it is able to coagulate both characteristics: stability and resilience.   Stability is 
assured by the presence of a formal document, signed by both parties, in which mutual rights and 
obligations are enshrined.  Resilience is reached thanks to the fact that, firstly, MoUs are diplomatic 
tools that do not need long and complex procedures of signing and modification; secondly, rights 
and obligations are drafted in general terms, leaving room for specification on a case-by-case basis. 
 
The legal value of MoUs is worth a special consideration.  According to article 2(I)(a) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties of 19699, an international treaty is: “an international agreement 
concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in 
a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation”.  
The UN International Law Commission has defined a treaty as: “any international agreement in 
written form, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and 
whatever its particular designation (treaty, convention, protocol, convenant, charter, statute, act, 
declaration, concordat, exchange of notes, agreed minutes, memorandum of agreement, modus 
vivendi or any other appellation), concluded between two or more States or other subjects of 
international law and governed by international law”10. 
 
From these two definitions, it appears that MoUs should be considered international treaties.  In 
particular, they could belong to the group of so-called executive or administrative agreements, i.e. 
the agreements which do not need a formal procedure of ratification, but come into force at the 
moment of signing11. 
 
In reality, the text of MoUs normally states a general purpose of greater co-operation between the 
parties, which takes form in the obligations established in the document, but without granting a 
binding force to such obligations.  In other words, the parties use MoUs as documents that organise 
their co-operation in an agreed form which, however, is not definitive in the sense that said parties 
are free to change it in any moment, if and when the need arises.  As an example, one can cite the 
standard formula of many Latin American MoUs which states that: “… ambas autoridades se 
comprometen a colaborar estrechamente en la consecucion de los objectivos indicados …”.  Even 
more clearly, a recent MoU signed by Nordic countries states that: “… the … authorities commit 
themselves to co-operate on a best-effort basis on all prudential matters pertaining to cross-border 
banking establishments”.   
 
Thus, we can conclude that it is difficult to consider binding obligations that are to be implemented 
and abided by on a best-effort basis by the parties involved.  The only real obligation, binding in 
legal terms, is the one that motivates parties to collaborate and sign the MoU in the first place. 
 
MoUs, with their resilience and reliability, have gained momentum against the background of 
current financial trends12.  In this respect, because of the creation of large conglomerates that have 
                                                          
9 See the Convention in American Journal of International Law, 1969, p. 63 or in International Legal Material, 1969, p. 
8. 
10 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1962, ii. 161. 
11 See extensively on the subject Browlie I., Principles of Public International Law, London, 1990, p. 612 ss. 
12 The use of MoU has become so frequent that major international standard setter organizations decided to propose 
general guidelines to the drafting of the text in order to facilitate the conclusions of these kinds of agreements.  See, for 
the insurance sector, IAIS, A Model Memorandum of Understanding, September 1997; for the banking sector, Basel 
Commitee, Essential elements of a statement of co-operation between banking supervisors, May 2001. 
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not only a wide diversification of activities, but also a business strategy which crosses domestic 
borders, supervisory authorities are compelled to find ways to collaborate with their foreign 
counterparts.  Nordic countries, for example, after the large M&A campaign on their markets, are 
trying out a new form of MoUs that organizes co-operation between more than two parties. 
 
The introduction of framework-MoUs is another example of the possible use of MoUs.  
Framework-MoUs answer the need of a common supervisory approach in respect of a specific 
geographical market: it lays down a general supervisory framework that single national authorities 
must complete with the negotiation of a bilateral MoU in which the general framework finds 
specification.  The EC Commission, for example, has signed a framework-MoU with US authorities 
on consolidated banking supervision.  Another framework-MoU is being negotiated with 
Switzerland.  
 
 
2.2 Multilateral Co-operation 
 
The other channel of co-operation is participating in multilateral fora.  These bodies usually consist 
of high-level relevant sectoral authority representatives and offer the opportunity to exchange 
information, study issues, elaborate common approaches, find common solutions to common 
problems.   
 
On a global level, the Basle Committee for Banking Supervision has great influence and it is one of 
the leading organizations.  Set up by the G-10 central bank Governors at the end of 1974, the 
Committee is not a formal supranational authority: it provides a forum for on-going co-operation 
between member countries’ supervisory authorities.  The Committee promotes convergence 
towards common approaches by formulating broad standards, best practices, guidelines 
implemented voluntarily by national authorities through their national regulatory structures13.  
Following an approach based on “peer pressure” rather than on legal enforcement authority, the 
Committee has played a pivot role in coordinating prudential supervision policies at the 
international level. 
 
From the start, the Committee has worked to improve the quality of banking supervision 
worldwide.  Important criteria have been identified both as a result of the elaboration of general 
supervisory principles and in response to specific episodes of crises.  The Concordat issued in 1975 
after the Herstatt Bank failure, and further refined in 1983, after the Ambrosiano affair, and in 1990, 
stresses the importance of exchanging information among supervisors and defines an allocation of 
responsibility in supervising international banks based on consolidated supervision and parent 
authority control.  A number of these criteria were reformulated as “Minimum Standards” in 1992, 
after the collapse of BCCI.  In 1997, a set of “Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision” 
was issued to spread best banking practices on the largest basis possible, especially among 
emerging countries. 
 
Capital adequacy has been a major focus of attention for the Committee.  In 1988, an agreement 
was reached on the need to halt the deterioration of international banks’ capital base.  With the 
publication of the Basle Capital Accord, minimum capital standards and a common framework for 
measuring capital adequacy were established.  By raising capital levels, the Accord contributed to 
strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking system.  Currently, the Accord is 
                                                          
13 See further Ho D.E., Compliance and International Soft Law: Why Do Countries Implement the Basle Accord, in 
Journal of International Economic Law, 2002, no. 3: 647-688. 
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under revision to render the standards more precise and articulated in order to take the subject’s 
different risk profile into account. 
 
The International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) gathers 164 world securities 
regulators.  Through its permanent structures, the organisation aims at co-operating to promote high 
standards of regulation in order to maintain just, efficient and sound markets.  Furthermore, IOSCO 
has developed its work towards establishing standards for an effective surveillance of international 
securities transactions, exchanging information, providing mutual assistance to promote the 
integrity of markets by rigorously applying said standards and by effectively enforcing against 
offences. 
 
Among IOSCO’s main papers, is a document which identifies the “Objectives and Principles of 
Securities Regulations”14.  The objectives are three: investor’s protection; efficient and competitive 
markets; reduction of the systemic risk.  To reach these objectives, the document then indicates 
thirty principles that involve regulators, supervisors, intermediaries and clients.   
 
It is worth reminding that IOSCO is actively working on all major issues for securities’ regulators.   
The Internet, for example, and its implications have been the object of increasing focus.  The 
organization has produced a document15 in which this new phenomenon is analysed and  
recommendations to cope with its various aspects are suggested.  Inter alia, it is important to 
underline the principle according to which jurisdiction over advertising and marketing activities 
belongs to the authority of the country towards which these activities are targeted. 
 
Another important organization is the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) 
whose membership comprises insurance supervisors from all over the world.  Created in 1994, IAIS 
has been set up to establish common guidelines for members as well as to provide mutual assistance 
to safeguard the integrity of markets. 
 
Among the documents issued by IAIS, are the “Insurance Core Principles” of 2000 and the 
“Principles applicable to the Supervision of International Insurers and Insurance Groups and their 
Cross-Border Business Operations” (Insurance Concordat) of 1999.   The former deals with 
principles for an effective supervision; it is stated clearly that an aspect of this effectiveness is close 
co-operation between supervisors.  The latter follows the example of the Basle Concordat to point 
out the need for a truly enacted supervision, also at consolidated level, and the opportunity of a 
close co-operation between home and host authority. 
 
In 1996, following the recommendations of the G-7 Summit in Halifax, the Basle Committee, 
IOSCO and IAIS created the Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates.  The mandate16 of the Joint 
Forum provides that it is “to draw up proposals for improving co-operation and the exchange of 
information between bank, securities and insurance supervisors and to work towards developing 
principles for the future supervision of financial conglomerates”.  The original mandate has been 
broadened in 1999 to take inter-sectoral issues (capital requirements, activity definitions, possible 
arbitrages, etc.) concerning parent companies into account and to improve the exchange of 
information between authorities. 
 
                                                          
14 IOSCO, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, Montreal, 1998. 
15 IOSCO, Securities Activity on the Internet, Montreal, 1998. 
16 The mandate of the Joint Forum can be visioned on the web sites of the mother organizations: www.bis.org; 
www.iosco.org; www.iais.org.  
 
 
www.dirittobancario.it - © Tutti i diritti riservati 
8
Until now, the Joint Forum has worked on defining a set of principles concerning: capital 
requirements, aiming to avoid the so-called double gearing; sectoral and inter-sectoral exchange of 
information; the identification of the lead-coordinator among supervisory authorities; etc.  
 
In 1999, following the findings of the Tietmeyer Report17 in the aftermath of the Asian crises, the 
G-7 countries created the Financial Stability Forum (FSF).  The Forum seeks to promote 
international financial stability, improve the functioning of financial markets and reduce systemic 
risks, co-ordinating the efforts of national authorities and international organizations engaged in 
financial stability.  The FSF meets regularly twice a year to assess issues and vulnerabilities 
affecting the global financial system and to identify and oversee the actions needed to address them.  
It reports to G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors.  Representatives from other 
multilateral fora (e.g., the Basle Committee) participate in the FSF meetings. 
 
 
3. European Union Financial Architecture and Supervisory Co-operation 
 
The governance structure for financial regulation in the European Union relies on two building 
blocks: harmonised regulation and national supervision.   
 
In the last twenty years, even though the EU Treaty does not contain an explicit allocation of 
regulatory powers to the European institutions, financial regulation in EU countries has been 
increasingly depending on the directives approved in Brussels.  Since the publication of the White 
Paper on the Single Market18 in 1985, financial integration has been indicated as a priority to 
achieve the single market, considering the economic importance of financial services. As a 
consequence, Member States and the European Commission have been working to introduce a core 
set of common concepts and rules.  
 
The financial single market works according to the three general principles of: (i) minimum 
harmonization of rules; (ii) mutual recognition of authorisation and supervisory structure; (iii) 
home-country control. On the basis of a common notion of financial intermediaries, objective 
criteria for licensing, branching and the cross-border provision of services have been harmonized. 
Basic prudential requirements in relation to capital adequacy and large exposures have been 
elaborated and implemented in all Member States, according to a common definition of own funds. 
Supervision has to be performed both on an individual and a consolidated basis. 
 
On the other hand, financial supervision remains at national level.  Reflecting the different national 
historical traditions and the specific features of national financial systems throughout the continent, 
prudential supervision is inspired by two main principles: 
 
• Subsidiarity: the principle stems from the fact that supervisory tasks are best performed as close 
as possible to supervised entities and that there still exists important differences in national 
financial systems and practices (i.e. legislative settings, deposit insurance systems)19. Given the 
                                                          
17 International Co-operation and Co-ordination in the Area of Financial Market Supervision and Surveillance, Report 
by H. Tietmeyer, 11th February 1999 available at www.fsforum.org.  
18 White Paper of the European Commission for the European Council (Milan, 28-29 June 1985), Il Completamento del 
Mercato Interno, COM(85) 310. 
19 Subsidiarity is enshrined in the EU Treaty (article 5) as general guiding principle for the European Community 
policies.  According to article 5, the Community shall take action only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and therefore be better achieved by the Community itself.  
See further, on the implemention of the principle, K. Lenaerts, P. Van Ypersele, Le principe de subsidiarité et son 
contexte: étude de l’article 3B du Traité CE, in Cahiers de droit européen, 1995: 2. 
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predominance of local intermediaries and local markets, the main issue in supervision continues 
to be the need to maintain a close relation between supervisors and supervised institutions at the 
local level. The national allocation of supervisory responsibilities also reflects the consideration 
that the impact of financial crises is borne by the public finances of single member States; 
 
• Neutrality: Members States are free to adopt the model they prefer for the allocation of 
regulatory, supervisory and financial stability functions (e.g., a single supervisor, vertical 
supervision, horizontal supervision, etc.). 
 
With the introduction of the Euro, the need for further financial integration has been more pressing.  
But, at the same time, this has not implied major changes in the basic governance structure.  The 
Maastricht Treaty has confirmed the described approach, granting the European Central Bank an 
advisory role with respect to EU and national financial regulation; the ECB is not responsible for 
prudential supervision but “contributes to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent 
authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the 
financial system” (art. 105.5 of the EC Treaty)20. The draft Constitution presently debated within 
the InterGovernmental Conference does not propose to alter this framework. 
 
Against this background, co-operation among supervisory authorities is a logical consequence of 
the harmonization of national practices: on the one hand, the existence of common rules requires a 
consistent approach in their implementation throughout the European Union; on the other hand, the 
increasing scope of cross-border activity, together with the creation of multi-business 
conglomerates, calls for extensive reliance on co-operation, sector and cross-sector.   
 
The scheme of co-operation is tailored on the traditional bivalence: bilateral-multilateral.   
 
Memorandums of Understanding are the key tool for bilateral co-operation.  They function as the 
basic channel for exchanging information between home and host-country supervisors and  
facilitating consolidated supervision.  MoUs normally respect a widely agreed form that includes 
practical provisions concerning the establishment of branches and subsidiaries and cross-border 
investigations.   
 
A more recent event is the diffusion of multilateral MoUs, i.e. a MoU signed by more than two 
parties.  These kind of documents are a hybrid form of co-operation since they are a multilateral 
instrument that could be invoked in bilateral relationships.  Their advantage is that they are a 
flexible tool which provides a framework for creating or developing supervisory co-operation along 
general guidelines applicable to all parties which are allowed to adjust and implement them on a 
case-by-case basis.  Recent examples of multilateral MoUs are the “MoU on co-operation between 
payment system overseers and banking supervisors in stage three of EMU”, signed in April 2001 
and “MoU on high level principles of co-operation between banking supervisors and central banks 
of the EU in crisis management” signed in March 200321. 
 
The other channel of collaboration is the participation in multilateral fora.  Since its very inception, 
the European Community provided the occasion for multilateral talks among its Member States and, 
with the collapse of Bretton Woods’ system and the gradual set-up of the common market, the 
necessity for a better co-ordination among supervisory authorities became even more impelling.   
                                                          
20 However, article 105.6 of the EC Treaty provides the possibility that the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal 
from the European Commission and after consulting the ECB and the European Parliament, may confer specific 
prudential tasks to the ECB (so-called enabling clause).  
21 See further par. 4.1. 
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The banking sector is the main example of close multilateral co-operation among European 
supervisory authorities: the Groupe de Contact (GdC) has been the first example, followed by the 
constitution of the Banking Advisory Committee (BAC) and, in more recent years, by the Banking 
Supervision Committee (BSC), under the aegis of the ECB. 
 
The GdC is a an important forum for discussions relating to day-to-day businesses and individual 
institution.  Created in 1972, its existence has been formalised both by the First and the Second 
Banking Coordination Directives.  Made up of senior officials from the Members States, plus 
Liechtenstein, Iceland and Norway, the Groupe has different tasks relating namely to: the exchange 
of information about particular problem institutions; the updating on developments in national 
supervisory arrangements, including administrative practices; the drafting of comparative studies on 
different aspects of supervisory practice22.  The GdC can exert a technical advisory task to the BAC 
and the EC Commission on major banking legislative proposals. 
 
The BAC is an advisory body to the Commission and it has the institutional task of examining each 
relevant proposal in the banking field.   Its creation has been provided for by article 11 of Directive 
77/780/EEC and its role has been confirmed by Directive 89/646/EEC.  The Committee has a 
general advisory competence on all of the Commission’s relevant financial legislative proposals. At 
the same time, according to the comitology regulatory procedure23, BAC is a technical committee 
that advises the Commission on the executive measures to be taken to implement banking 
directives24. 
 
Finally, the BSC is the relevant forum for addressing the issues raised by the beginning of the third 
phase of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), namely the relationship between national 
supervisory authorities and the ECB, since supervisory powers have not been centralised like the 
monetary policy and they belong to the domestic jurisdiction of Member States.  Set up in October 
1998 as an ESCB committee, the BSC has a twofold mandate: firstly, it is to facilitate co-operation 
between the Eurosystem and national supervisory authorities; secondly, it must foster co-operation 
between supervisors, beyond the interests of the Eurosystem.  The accomplishment of these tasks is 
favoured by the fact that BSC’s members are both national supervisory authorities and NCBs that 
do not have supervisory tasks. 
 
In the other financial sectors multilateral co-operation has a shorter track-record because cross-
border activities have been developing only in more recent years.  However, both the securities and 
the insurance sectors have followed the example of the banking sector in setting up European 
multilateral fora of co-ordination25.  For the securities sector, it is worth mentioning the High Level 
Securities Supervisors Committee (HLSSC), created to assist and advise the Commission on policy 
issues relating to securities markets and the development of the relevant European legislation, and 
the UCITS Contact Committee, set up to assist the Commission and the Member States in the 
                                                          
22 P. Cooke, Developments in Cooperation among Banking Supervisory Authorities, in Bank of England Quarterly 
Bulletin (June 1981): 238-244. 
23 The comitology procedure is provided for by decision 1999/468/EC of 28th June 1999 and deals with the procedures 
to use in issuing measures to implement EC legislation.  In particular, the decision organises three types of procedures 
(regulatory procedure, management procedure, advisory procedure) in which national authorities, through  participation 
in technical committees, have a different degree of involvement in drafting such executive measures. 
24 See extensively on the BAC, G. Godano, Comitato Consultivo Bancario, in Diritto bancario comunitario (eds. G. 
Alpa and F. Capriglione), 2002, p. 339 ss.  
25 For a complete description of EU co-operation structure for these sectors see European Commission, Institutional 
Arrangements for the Regulation and Supervision of the Financial Sector, Brussels, 1999. 
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implementation of the UCITS directive26.  In the insurance sector, the directive on direct insurance27 
created the Insurance Committee (IC) with the same tasks as the BAC (advisor to the Commission 
and comitology functions)28.  
 
The multilateral structure just described has been working very effectively, providing an invaluable 
networks of contacts for national supervisory authorities with their European counterparties.  These 
contacts have not only favoured a better implementation of EU financial legislation, but they have 
also spurred a progressive convergence of supervisory practices, enhancing consistency throughout 
the continent.  This was confirmed by the Brouwer I Report which concludes that “the existing 
institutional arrangements provide a coherent and flexible basis for safeguarding financial stability 
in Europe”29. 
 
However, with the launch of the project aimed at creating a Single Market for financial services, 
elaborated by the Member States and the European Commission in the late ’90, Community actors 
have begun to re-design the approach to co-operation within the EU, placing increasing emphasis 
on the need for even greater uniformity in prudential practices in order to create a level playing field 
for financial intermediaries all over the EU30 while improving effectiveness in supervisory actions.  
These are the main reasons inspiring the reforms proposed by the Lamfalussy Report in 2001 and 
the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) Report in 2002. 
 
 
3.1 The Single Market for Financial Services 
 
The notion of “Single Market for Financial Services” refers to the situation created after 1993 
according to which a European financial intermediary, lawfully established in one Member State, 
may enjoy the use of the “European passport” and then offer its services throughout the EU.  This 
offer may take the form of a physical establishment in another Member State or of the provision of 
cross-border services. 
 
Since 1993, national markets have progressively opened to intermediaries coming from other 
Member States.  In France, for instance, there were 59 branches of EU financial intermediaries in 
2000 compared to 46 in 1995, while for subsidiaries the number increased from 73 to 108 in the 
same period.  In Spain, for the same period 1995-2000, the numbers confirm the increase: from 36 
to 42 branches, and from 20 to 38 subsidiaries31. 
 
These data confirm the success of a project which was started with the introduction of the Second 
Banking Co-ordination Directive.  If the idea was to offer means to facilitate the free movement, the 
results went far beyond any expectation, creating a solid legislative framework on which it has been 
                                                          
26 Directive 85/611/EEC of 20th December 1985 on co-ordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) in J.O.C.E. L375 of 31st December 
1985. 
27 Directive 91/675/EEC of 19th December 1991 on setting up an insurance committee in J.O.C.E. L374 of 31st 
December 1991. 
28 For the sake of completeness, it is important to recall that European insurance authorities set up in 1957 a Conference 
of Insurance Supervisory Authorities of the EEC as an informal discussion forum, but it never acquired a decisive role 
for multilateral co-operation. 
29 Report on Financial Stability, prepared by the Ad Hoc Working Group of the Economic and Financial Committee, 
May 2000, in Economic Papers of the European Commission, n. 143:7. 
30 On the need for more efficiency in market structures within the EU see Report by the Economic and Financial 
Committee on EU Financial Integration, May 2002, in Economic Papers of the European Commission, n. 171. 
31 Elaboration on ECB data (2000). 
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possible to build strong commercial intra-European relations, while spurring at the same time other 
legislative initiatives which have enriched and completed the picture.  In this respect, it is possible 
to recall directive 93/22/EEC on investment services, directive 94/19/EC on deposit-guarantee 
schemes, directive 95/26/EC post-BCCI, directive 97/9/EC on investor-compensation schemes. 
 
This success was not easy to reach and it had to reckon with many difficulties.  As pointed out by 
Dassesse32, the approach introduced by the directive 89/646/EEC raised many issues: a) the extent 
of the notification procedure; b) the exact scope of general interest clause; c) the clear distinction 
between physical establishment and free provision of cross-border services in specific cases (e.g. 
electronic transactions).  The European Commission tried to answer to some of these questions with 
an Interpretative Communication, looking for more consistency in the implementation of legislative 
acts across Member States.  
 
But far more difficult were the political issues linked to the creation of the Single Market for 
Financial Services and the introduction of the single currency.  Is it enough to have a co-ordination 
of general principles to make the Single Market work or it is necessary to push integration beyond? 
What should be the relationship between legislative integration and market integration? The former 
should spur the latter or viceversa? And again, what’s the role of national authorities in a highly 
integrated environment such as the Single Market? 
 
Member States and European Institutions have tried to answer to some of these questions designing 
a strategy aimed at accelerating the integration within the Single Market.  Thus, the European 
Council of Cardiff in 1998 requested the European Commission “…to table a framework for action 
… to improve the single market in financial services”33. 
 
In 1999, the European Commission launched the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP)34.  
According to the document of the Commission, “… with the introduction of the euro, there is a 
unique window of opportunity to equip the EU with a modern financial apparatus in which the cost 
of capital and financial intermediation are kept to a minimum”.  Then, it was necessary to prepare 
an articulated legislative plan in order to review the regulatory framework in the area of financial 
services.  The European Council held in Lisbon in 2000, endorsing the Plan, indicated 2005 as the 
final deadline for its completion35. 
 
The content of the Plan is very heterogeneous since it contains a large variety of measures.  First of 
all, it covers both the banking sector and the securities sector.  It contains wholesale markets as well 
as retail markets provisions.  There are measures dedicated to the good functioning of clearing and 
settlement systems. 
 
From the technical point of view, it is important to emphasize that all legislative measures included 
in the FSAP are still based on the original principles of “minimum harmonization+mutual 
recognition+home country control”.  The repartition of competence between the Member States and 
the European Community is apparently still built around this basic scheme. 
 
                                                          
32 M. Dassesse, A courageous initiative and an important precedent, in Butterworths Jour. of International Banking and 
Financial Law, Sept. 1997: 339. 
33 Cardiff European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 1998 available at www.consilium.eu.int. 
34 European Commission, Financial Services: Implementing the Framework for Financial Markets: Action Plan, 
COM(1999)232 of 11th May 1999. 
35 For a description of the FSAP see M. Merlin, Le plan d’action sur les services financiers, in Revue du Droit de 
l’Union Européenne, n. 4, 2002: 687-709. 
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In reality, the scheme has acquired a new element with the creation of the Financial Services Policy 
Group (FSPG).  The Group, composed by representatives of the national Finance Ministries and the 
European Commission, has the task of coordinating the activities linked to the accomplishment of 
the FSAP. 
 
In its work, the FSPG has stressed its guiding role of policy planner.  Within this Group, Member 
States and the European Commission have tried to agree on political guidelines to be transposed in 
the legislative measures of the Plan in order not only to facilitate the adoption of the single measure, 
but also to influence the transposition at national level.  It is also interesting to note that the 
guidelines issued by the FSPG are political in essence.  In fact, the membership of the Group is not 
open to technical national authorities.  This choice lies in the desire to centralise the strategic 
decision-making process, shielding it from any national or sectoral interference. 
 
The creation of the FSPG is then a turning point in the governance structure of the European 
financial regulatory system since it provides the Single Market for financial services with a strong 
political decision centre.  National interests are downgraded in favour of a more supranational 
approach and, most of all, Member States loose their exclusive competence in the transposition of 
legislative acts.  The presence of the FSPG expresses the need for a better and closer co-ordination 
in both the drafting and the implementation of EU acts because the degree of integration depends 
not only on the existence of harmonised rules but also on the convergence of national 
implementation practices. 
 
3.2 The Lamfalussy Report 
 
In 2000, the EcoFin Council requested a group of so-called Wise Men, chaired by Baron A. 
Lamfalussy36, to propose practical arrangements for implementation of the Community rules 
concerning the areas identified by the FSAP.  In particular, the group was requested to consider how 
to achieve a more effective approach towards transposition and implementation for areas like: the 
listing of companies, the public offer of securities and requirements relating to reporting by issuers, 
the conduct of cross-border financial operations, the day-to-day operation of regulated markets, the 
protection of consumers and investors in the provision of investment services, and the integrity of 
the market. 
 
The Wise Men, after extensive consultations with national authorities and the financial industry, 
presented their conclusions in a Final Report37 (known also as the Lamfalussy Report) which was 
formally adopted by the EU Council during the Stockholm summit in march 2001.  Despite the 
narrow mandate given by the EcoFin Council, the Report conducts a comprehensive analysis on the 
state of the Internal Market, evaluating the advantages of a greater integration in the financial 
services area and the factors that hinder this process. 
 
According to the Final Report, an integrated European financial market would provide a more 
rational allocation of capital, allowing greater liquidity access to companies and lowering the cost 
of capital; consumers would have greater opportunity of investment with higher net yields.  At the 
macroeconomic level, these benefits would imply an increased productivity of capital and labour, 
enhancing the potential for stronger GDP growth and job creation.   
 
                                                          
36 The other wise men were C. Herkströter, L.A. Rojo, B. Ryden, L. Spaventa, N. Walter e N. Wicks. 
37 Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets, Bruxelles, 15th 
February 2001, available at europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/finances. 
 
 
www.dirittobancario.it - © Tutti i diritti riservati 
14
However, there are still too many factors that slow market integration.  The Wise Men point out that 
many financial areas lack a European-wide regulation; that very often the implementation of the 
European legislation lacks consistency across Member States, causing serious interpretation 
problems; that the legislative procedure is too burdensome.  Focusing on this last issue, the Report 
considers that the present procedure has a number of major shortcomings, being very slow, not 
flexible enough to take into account market developments and unable to distinguish between core, 
enduring, principles and practical, day to day, implementing rules. 
 
The solution proposed by the Report to solve these questions is a different approach to regulatory 
and supervisory procedures.  In the first place, the document recognises two layers in the legislation 
related to financial markets: basic political choices that can be translated into broad but sufficiently 
precise framework norms (level 1); and the more detailed technical measures, in full conformity 
with this framework, needed to implement the objectives pursued by the legislation (level 2).  This 
distinction, without any modification to the EU Treaty, would allow EU Institutions to design rules 
in a faster and more flexible way because the level 1 legislative acts will be limited to general 
principles while delegating detailed regulation to further work of technical bodies.  
 
In this respect, the Report specifies that level 2 would see at work the European Commission and 
representatives of national Finance Ministries to define, propose and decide on the implementing 
details of framework level 1 legislative acts.  In particular, according to the comitology procedure, 
the European Commission will prepare regulatory proposals in close co-operation with a committee 
composed by national regulators and will issue the technical measures with the approval of a 
committee composed by representatives of national Finance Ministries. 
 
Levels 1 and 2 will complemented by a level 3 and a level 4.  The level 3, centred on the work of 
the committee of national regulators, would have the task of ensuring the consistency of the day to 
day transposition and implementation of level 1 and 2 rules.  In other words, the national regulators’ 
committee will have to produce guidelines and best practices for the administrative regulations to be 
adopted at the national level as well as issue joint interpretative recommendations, even on matters 
not covered by EU legislation.  This would assure a very high degree of supervisory and regulatory 
convergence among Member States. 
 
Finally, the level 4 concerns strengthening the enforcement of Community rules, improving the 
relevant powers of European Institutions.  In particular, the Final Report calls for a better 
monitoring of national developments by the European Commission. 
 
The EU Council’s endorsement of the Final Report has allowed a quick implementation of the 
Lamfalussy approach in the securities sector.  In June 2001, the European Commission38 established 
the two committees foreseen in the document of the Wise Men: the European Securities Committee 
(ESC) and the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), replacing the HLSS and the 
UCITS Contact Committee.  In February 2002, after an inter-institutional agreement between the 
EU Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament39, the reform for the securities 
sector was finalised. 
                                                          
38 Decisions of the European Commission 2001/527/EC and 2001/528/EC of 6th June 2001, in J.O.C.E. L191 of 13th 
July 2001. 
39 The inter-institutional agreement was necessary to overcome the objections of the European Parliament on the 
compatibility of the reform with the provisions of the EU Treaty.  The agreement is based on temporal limitation to the 
regulatory powers (level 2) of the European Commission (so-called sunset clause).  See for further details Intervention 
by President Romano Prodi to the European Parliament’s plenary session, Strasbourg, 5th February 2002, available at 
europa.eu.int/rapid. 
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3.3 The EFC Report 
 
The Lamfalussy Report set an important precedent in the area of financial services because the 
analysis on which it is built clearly states issues which are very often replicated, although with 
specific features and with different degree of incidence, in each of the other financial sectors.  
Problems like fragmentation, high costs of transaction, legal differences affect also banking and 
insurance services.  But similarities are to be found also in the problems concerning the regulatory 
process and the relationships among supervisory authorities.  In 2000, the Brouwer I Report already 
called for some enhancements in European supervisory structures mainly strengthening cross-sector 
co-operation on large financial groups, improving the exchange of information among different 
supervisory authorities, and with central banks, and working on convergence of supervisory 
practices40.  In 2001, the Brouwer II Report on crisis management confirmed the need for closer co-
operation in order to prevent and properly manage systemic crisis41. 
 
As a consequence, the EcoFin Council feel compelled to repeat the exercise started with the 
Lamfalussy Report, looking into the possibility of introducing a major regulatory reform also for 
the banking and the insurance sector.  In May 2002, the EFC received the mandate to draft a report 
suggesting possible options to make EU arrangements for financial regulation, supervision and 
stability more efficient42. 
 
The mandate given to the EFC contained very precise terms of references.  The new arrangements 
should have respected the allocation of powers and responsibilities set out in the EU Treaty, the 
appropriate accountability to EU institutions, the principle of subsidiarity (“…since supervisory 
tasks are best performed as close as possible to supervised entities and since financial crises may 
have implications for public finances”) and the principle of neutrality. 
 
The work of the EFC has been aimed not only at ensuring consistency among the different financial 
sectors (banking, securities, insurance and financial conglomerates), but also at creating a more 
general picture where the technical work of supervisory authorities goes hand in hand with the 
strategic objectives set by the EcoFin Council.  The underlying idea behind the entire project was 
far more ambitious than the simple enhancing of sectoral and inter-sectoral regulatory action 
because it wanted to create an articulated structure able to make the regulatory action answer to 
inputs and suggestions coming from the design of European policy in the financial services area.  In 
other words, the EFC was entrusted by the EcoFin with the task of redesign the European financial 
governance structure. 
 
However, the reform is not aimed at creating a centralisation of supervisory and regulatory 
responsibilities, in accordance with the neutrality and subsidiarity principles.  The structure will be 
based on multilateral fora where participating national authorities will formally retain their 
competence in regulatory and supervisory matters43. 
 
                                                          
40 European Commission. Report on Financial Stability, supra: 7-8. 
41 Economic and Financial Committee. Report on Financial Crisis Management, Brussels, 2001. 
42 ECOFIN Council, Mandate to the Economic and Financial Committee for work on EU financial stability, supervision 
and integration, 7 May 2002. 
43 See, e.g., M.J. Nieto and J.M. Peñalosa, Notas sobre la arquitectura de la regulación, supervisión y estabilidad 
financiera en Europa, in Estabilidad financiera, Banco de España, no. 4, 2003:187; R.M. Lastra, The Governance 
Structure for Financial Regulation and Supervision in Europe, FMG Special Papers no. 149, 2003: 11. 
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The first recommendation of the EFC Report is the extension of the Lamfalussy approach to the 
banking and insurance sectors.  This implies that the four level approach is applied with the 
simultaneous creation of levels 2 and 3 sectoral committees.  The level 2 committees will be similar 
to the ESC: they would act as a regulatory committees according to the 1999 Council comitology 
decision and they should provide advice to the Commission on draft legislative texts.  The level 3 
committees will be similar to CESR: they should advise the Commission in preparing draft 
legislative texts; promote consistent implementation of EU acts, supervisory convergence and best 
practices in Member States; and provide an effective operational network to enhance day-to-day 
supervision, also including the exchange of information. 
 
As concerns level 3 banking committee, it is important to underline the participation of national 
central banks even if they do not have supervisory responsibilities in their country.  This choice was 
dictated by the desire to profit from synergies between banking supervision and central banking, 
like44.   
 
The Report provides also the creation of a level 2 committee for financial conglomerates.  This 
committee will assume the tasks provided for in directive 2002/87/EC on financial conglomerates45, 
namely.  A level 3 committee for financial conglomerates was not deemed necessary since its 
functions are performed by periodical joint meetings of the three sectoral level 3 committees. 
 
The new structure built according the Lamfalussy approach will replace in part the old multilateral 
co-operation.  The BAC as well as the IC will be suppressed.  Representatives of the BSC and of 
the Groupe de Contact will be allowed to sit in the level 3 banking committee as observers.  The 
Groupe de Contact should continue its activities and also act as the main working group of the level 
3 banking committee. 
 
 
Level Banking Sector Insurance and 
Pensions 
Securities and 
UCITS 
Financial 
Conglomerates 
 
Level 2 
European Banking 
Committee (EBC) 
European 
Insurance 
Committee (EIC) 
European 
Securities 
Committee (ESC) 
Financial 
Conglomerate 
Committee (FCC)
 
Level 3 
Committee of 
European Banking 
Regulators 
(CEBS) 
Committee of 
European 
Insurance and 
Pensions 
(CEIOPS) 
Committee of 
European 
Securities 
Regulators 
(CESR) 
 
 
 
The second recommendation of the EFC Report is the establishment of a new structure entrusted 
with financial stability and strategic policy tasks.  The document creates a new committee, the 
Financial Services Committee (FSC), which will replace the Financial Services Policy Group.  The 
FSC fills the gap between the political and technical regulatory levels, and provide for cross-
sectoral strategic reflection, separate from the legislative process.  In particular, the new committee 
should help the EcoFin Council to define the medium and long term strategy for financial services 
issues; consider “hot” short-term issues; and assess progress and implementation of the strategy set.  
It should also provide the EcoFin Council with political advice and oversight on both internal issues 
                                                          
44 See further on the subject European Central Bank, The Role of Central Banks in Prudential Supervision, March 2001. 
45 Directive 2002/87/EC of 16th December 2002 on supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance 
undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate in J.O.C.E. L35 of 11th February 2003. 
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(e.g., the Single Market for Financial Services) and external issues (e.g., WTO and enlargement 
issues).  The FSC is composed by representatives of national Finance Ministries and the European 
Commission, while the ECB and chairs of level 2 and 3 committees will have observers’ status. 
 
Thus, the FSC should ideally act as a think-tank of the EcoFin Council for strategic planning in the 
area of financial services, evaluating areas of interest, setting priorities, elaborating strategies and 
monitoring their implementation.  In the view of the EFC, the role of this committee is particularly 
important to guide the integration of European financial markets even though its close dependency 
on the EcoFin Council (e.g., the composition of the FSC reflects the composition of the EcoFin 
Council) and its informal legal status may limit its scope of action.   
 
The EFC Report deals also with the issue related to financial stability, entrusting the EFC with the 
task of advising the EcoFin Council, in accordance with article 114.2 of the EU Treaty46.  The FSC 
will contribute actively to the work of the EFC on such issue.   
 
The attention given by the Report to the question of financial stability answers to a need for better 
knowledge on shaping factors and driving forces behind current developments in financial markets.  
Drawing the lessons from the crises of last years, Governments and supervisory authorities are 
increasingly aware of the importance of monitoring not only macroeconomics variables but also the 
dynamics underlying financial markets47, given their disruptive potential for economic systems.  
Then, the EFC Report considers important to provide the EU with a system of financial stability 
surveillance in order to keep update the EcoFin Council on any relevant development. 
 
                                                          
46 Article 114.2 states that, among other things, “The Economic and Financial Committee shall … keep under review the 
economic and financial situation of the Member States and of the Community and report regularly thereon to the 
Council and the Commission”. 
47 See further C.J. Lindgren, T.J.T. Baliño, C. Enoch, A.M. Gulde, M. Quintyn, L. Teo, Financial Sector Crisis and 
Restructuring, Lessons from Asia, IMF Occasional Paper no. 188, Washington, 1999. 
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The EcoFin Council has endorsed the EFC Report on 3rd December 2002.  The EcoFin Council also 
asked the European Commission to rapidly settle down the institutional arrangements to set up the 
new committees and make the new structure work.  In fact, it necessary not only to formally create 
the new committees, but also to insert them in the acquis communautaire.  In this respect, the 
establishment of the level 2 committees implies the modification of relevant directives, such as the 
directive 2000/12/EC for the banking sector or the directive for the insurance sector, with the 
subsequent need to open a legislative process in accordance with article 251 of the EU Treaty.  
Consequently, works are under way to ensure the passage to the framework.  The European 
Commission set the beginning of 2004 as the final deadline to have all the structures in place.  
 
On the contrary, the establishment of financial stability arrangements are already in place.  The FSC 
have been installed with an EcoFin Council decision of 18 February 2003 and it started it activities 
in March 200348.  Likewise, the EFC held its first formal meeting dedicated to the European 
financial stability review in March 2003. 
 
It is still difficult to make a thorough evaluation of the reform since many elements still miss and 
the entire framework should still be tested in the real world.  However, some commentators have 
already express criticism for the complex structure with a multiplicity of committees.  If the original 
idea was to speed up the production of EU financial rules, increasing flexibility and uniformity 
across Europe, many could be deceived.  Lastra notes that regulatory and supervisory co-operation 
in the EU “…should proceed along the lines of consolidation and streamlining of existing 
committees, rather than through the creation of new committees, which bring about a duplicity or 
multiplicity of supervisory forums, often leading to a confusion or to an overlap of lines of 
responsibility and membership, to a cumbersome and unduly complicated decision-making process 
and, possibly, to bureaucratic inefficiency”49. 
 
These fears are not to be undervalued since many aspects of the Reform should still be clarified, 
such as the relationships between sectoral level 2 and level 3 committees, the exact role of the FSC 
or the place reserved to the European Parliament.  All these questions have a relevant impact on the 
regular functioning of the structure since they are connected with the very philosophy on which the 
Reform is based; thus, they deserve a clear and immediate answer.  Furthermore, the new 
framework should also take into account the participation of the new Member States from 2004 
onwards: the increase in the number of participants will make the functioning of the new structure 
even more complex, posing real viability problems50. 
 
 
4. International Supervisory Co-operation and Crisis Management 
 
Crisis management is an issue that is acquiring growing importance in the area of supervisory co-
operation.  The dimension and the features of financial crises in the last few years left no doubt on 
the fact that only a co-ordinated action by all involved actors may offer the possibility of a way out.  
In fact, the literature51 agrees on that recent crises are dual in essence: on the one side, there are 
                                                          
48 Council Decision (doc. 6264/1/03) available at http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/ecofin/74571.pdf.  
49 Lastra, The Governance Structure, supra: 12. 
50 In the level 3 banking committee the representation of 25 Member States will imply the participation of over 70 
persons for each meeting, considering full members, their technical experts and observers. 
51 See, among the others, J. Sachs, A.Tornell and A. Velasco, Financial Crises in Emerging Markets: the Lessons of 
1995, Brooking Papers on Economy Activity no. 1, 1996: 147-217; G. Corsetti, P. Pesenti and N. Roubini, What 
Caused the Asian Currency and Financial Crises?, Temi di Discussione della Banca d’Italia no. 343, 1998, G. Ortiz, 
Recent Emerging Markets Crisis – What We Have Learnt, Per Jacobson Lecture 2002, Basle. 
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macroeconomic imbalances; on the other, there are structural distortions in the functioning of the 
financial system that not only make these crises more severe, but provoke contagion effects due to 
the globalisation of financial markets52. 
 
Hence, the issue of good governance in the context of crisis prevention and management is gaining 
momentum since in these situations of emergencies it is extremely important to manage resources 
efficiently and to formulate, implement and enforce sound resolution strategies.  A growing 
agreement is developing on the fact that there should be a continuum between governance in normal 
times and crisis times, because crisis governance is predicated on governance practices in normal 
times53.   
 
At the same time, it is important to assure a large degree of flexibility since it is always difficult to 
predict the exact features of the actions needed.  Co-operation should be engaged on the basis of 
general principles which do not pre-empt specific outcomes and leave the authorities free to adapt 
to current situations. 
 
This approach leads national authorities to draw more attention on the measures to avoid systemic 
instability, elaborating strategies both to prevent and manage financial crises.  In both respects, the 
supervisory co-operation among foreign authorities acquires a specific role because it allows the 
exchange of information and the possibility of concerted interventions, defining the role of the 
different authorities involved.   
 
The exchange of information is vital to allow a permanent and reliable monitoring of international 
activities of financial intermediaries.  The availability of information allows supervisory authorities 
to verify the soundness conditions of the markets and detect problems before the crisis unfolds.  If 
the crisis is already underway, timely information sharing may define the extent of the problems 
(i.e., their systemic dimension), what are their specific features and if there is some kind of response 
by the market or the intermediaries.   
 
As a consequence, there is an international consensus that (i) there should be no obstacles to 
information sharing between supervisors; (ii) the confidentiality of shared information must be 
secured; and (iii) supervisors should take a proactive stance toward co-operation, both in providing 
and in requesting assistance and information.  The three aspects are linked together since the 
proactive stance is possible only if there are no obstacles or confidentiality problems.   
 
Of course, these issues are deeply intertwined with the design of domestic regulatory frameworks 
because it implies the existence of rules which allow such exchange and the question about 
information sharing may then come across other important issues such as the protection of privacy 
or the duty of disclosure to the Judiciary.  Thus, it is impossible to go further than general principles 
and each specific situation should be handled on case-by-case basis. 
 
However, the Basel Committee invited its Members to have a open approach towards the matter 
and, in its Report titled “Supervisory Guidance on Dealing with Weak Banks” of March 2002, 
recommends that co-operation among banking supervisors should be based “on agreements … on 
information sharing, particularly in a crisis” in order to have access to all relevant information. 
                                                          
52 G. Kaminsky and C. Reinhart, On Crises, Contagion and Confusion, in Journal of International Economics, Vol. 51, 
2000: 146-147. 
53 U. Das and M. Quintyn, Financial Crises Prevention and Management: the Role of Regulatory Governance, in 
Financial Sector Governance. The Role of the Public and Private Sectors, ed. by R. Litan, M. Pomerlano and V. 
Sundararajan, Washington, 2002: . 
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Likewise, the IAIS issued a “Supervisory Standard on the Exchange of Information” in January 
2002.  The document has been designed to clarify the conditions and the requirements insurance 
supervisors around the world are expected to apply when sharing information between them and 
with other supervisors.  This text draws the attention on the fact that, in emergency conditions, 
supervisors must make best efforts to speed up the process of information sharing.   
 
The other aspect of international co-operation in financial crisis situation is the repartition of roles 
between supervisors.  When foreign branches or subsidiaries of a financial institution in troubles are 
involved, there is always the question of understanding who does what.  The issue is relevant 
because it has many consequences not only for supervisors, but also for governments, taxpayers and 
stakeholders at large.  Entrusting crisis management responsibilities implies that actions should be 
taken to restore stability, bearing all the costs that go with the solution adopted.  As a consequence, 
it is important to have a clear definition of roles in order to ensure effectiveness and to avoid 
confusion which may worsen the crisis. 
 
The basic definition of roles is attached to the scheme home country supervisor – host country 
supervisor.  The interest at stake by the two supervisors depends very much on the type of crisis 
they are confronted to since the troubles may arise at the level of the parent company or at the level 
of the foreign branch or subsidiary.  In both cases, supervisors should have a contingency plan that 
allows timely consultations prior to take supervisory actions. 
 
The Basel Committee’s Report on weak banks makes a distinction based on the type of 
establishment: in the case of a subsidiary, which is a company incorporated in the host country, host 
authorities may try, to the extent possible, to protect it by ring-fencing; on the other hand, in the 
case of a branch, home country authorities bears the main responsibility to assure solvency and 
ring-fencing by host country authorities may prove ineffective.  Nonetheless, in both cases, host 
authorities may always decide to revoke the license and close all activities conducted by the foreign 
institution.  
 
 
4.1 Financial crisis management in the European Union 
 
Member States are familiar with the debate on financial crisis management in the European Union.  
Europe has suffered the direct or indirect effects of recent financial crises and there is growing 
awareness on the need for clear and effective strategies in these situations.  Moreover, the very 
integrated environment of the European Union is a favourable ground for crises with cross-border 
effects: the Brouwer II Report on financial crisis management54 recognises that, even though the 
degree of integration in the different markets is uneven, however it is possible to imagine that the 
unsecured interbank deposit market and the derivatives market may be sufficiently integrated to 
cause major disruption across Member States. 
 
The issues to which European authorities are faced are the same as those at the more general 
international level: the timely exchange of information and the repartition of roles.  However, these 
issues acquire a specific significance in the context of the European Union where authorities have to 
deal with a supranational regulatory framework and the national exercise of supervisory functions.  
Furthermore, the conduct of a single monetary policy and the existence of tight rules on public 
deficits should be taken into account when designing national strategies to crisis management. 
                                                          
54 EFC, Report on Financial Crisis Management, Economic Papers of the European Commission no. 156, July 2001: 
13. 
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For many years, national supervisory authorities have relied on bilateral MoUs as the institutional 
tool to cope with crisis situations.  In fact, their scope is wide enough to apply the rules on the 
exchange of information also to emergency situations and sometimes they even contain some more 
specific rules on how to organise the co-ordination in case of crisis.  However, there is no single 
European standard in this respect and each Mou is the product of bilateral negotiations adjusted on a 
case-by-case basis. 
 
More recently, the situation have been partly changed by the entry into force of some EU legislative 
acts which provide for more specific obligations on national authorities in the event of a crisis.  
Directive 95/26/EC55 (so-called post-BCCI directive because it was approved after the BCCI 
scandal) contains obligations for the exchange of information among European supervisory 
authorities in all financial sectors and, in the case of the banking sector, even a provision for 
information sharing between banking supervisors and central banks.   
 
Directives 2001/17/EC56 and 2001/24/EC57 provide a European regulatory framework for the 
reorganisation and winding up of insurance companies and credit institutions.  The two directives 
are based on an approach that centralises all remedial proceedings in the home country whose 
authorities have the main responsibility for deciding and managing the intervention, even for 
branches established in other Member States.  As a consequence, the law applicable to the 
proceedings, with few exception (e.g., immovable property, netting and repurchase agreements, 
transactions on regulated markets), is the law of the home country.  Host authorities are informed of 
the decisions taken in the home country and shall collaborate actively to their implementation. 
 
Finally, to complete the picture of supervisory co-operation in this area, it is useful to recall that in 
March 2003, banking supervisory authorities and central banks signed a MoU on crisis 
management.  It applies to crisis situations affecting banks and banking groups with significant 
cross-border distribution of business which have the potential to create systemic wide disturbances.  
The document contains co-operation mechanisms and information-sharing procedures to facilitate 
the flow of information needed in a crisis situation among involved authorities.  In particular, the 
MoU identify the home authorities as the authorities responsible for crisis management and the 
practical conditions for sharing information at cross-border level. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
As stated by the G-7 Finance Ministers before the Genoa Summit58, the proper functioning of the 
international financial system is at the heart of a healthy global economy.  The development of 
conditions fostering financial and economic stability is essential if the benefits of global economic 
integration are to be sustainable and broadly shared. 
 
                                                          
55 Directive 95/26/EC of 29th June 1995 amending directives 77/780/EEC, 89/646/EEC, 73/239/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 
79/267/EEC, 92/96/EEC, 93/22/EEC and 85/611/EEC with a view to reinforcing prudential supervision, in J.O.C.E. 
L168 of 18th July 1995. 
56 Directive 2001/17/EC of 19th March 2001 on the reorganisation and winding up of insurance undertakings, in 
J.O.C.E. L110 of 20th April 2001. 
57 Directive 2001/24/EC of 4th April 2001 on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions, in J.O.C.E. L125 
of 5th May 2001. 
58 Report transmitted by the G-7 Finance Ministers to the Heads of State and Government. Strengthening the 
International Financial System and Multilateral Development Banks. Rome, 7 July 2001. 
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International co-operation between supervisory authorities is justified by a clear and present need.  
The rapid development of cross-border financial activity puts pressure on national authorities to 
adapt their prudential policies.  Nowadays, it would be impossible to think that a supervisory action 
at a purely domestic level is effective. 
 
The contribution of international prudential co-operation to the new international economic order is 
not negligible.  The current supervisory structures represent a firm point in the shifting landscape of 
financial activity.  The framework described has worked effectively up to now and has contributed 
to building up not only sound cross-border information procedures, but also a climate of mutual 
confidence and trust among supervisors, which is always the condicio sine qua non to overcome 
difficulties that might materialize. 
 
Therefore, this positive experience is a good basis to face the new challenges of increased 
competition and integration of financial markets, even though supervisors are aware of the fact that 
it is essential to stay open-minded vis-à-vis the increasing complexity of cross-border financial 
activity. A mix of experience and ability to adapt to innovation will be the right spirit to guide co-
operation in years to come. 
 
These reflections may also apply to the regulatory and supervisory governance in the European 
Union.  In many respects, European financial markets are anticipating the integration many people 
would like to achieve in other sectors, and the progresses accomplished until now are a valuable 
contribution to the cause of the European Single Market. 
 
As many studies reported, the robustness of EU financial governance owes much to the reliability of 
relations between national supervisory authorities across the Union.  Both bilateral and multilateral 
relations have created a solid network of contacts through which it has been possible to manage the 
increasing cross-border activities of European financial intermediaries and to ensure stability 
throughout the EU. 
 
The reform requested by the EcoFin Council is aimed at enhancing the present framework thanks to 
a better definition of strategies and roles among the different actors.  The next few years will tell 
about the effectiveness of the measures proposed since many challenges will await the new 
framework.  Enlargement will be one of the most ambitious because the inclusion of the new 
Members in the new governance structure will strengthen the system and ensure financial stability 
across the continent. 
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